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Over the last twenty years, North America has traveled a 
strange journey indeed. In the early 1990s, the region 
bombastically inaugurated what was supposed to become an 
integrated market, pooling together the economic strengths 
of three member countries and foreshadowing increased 
political cooperation. In the early 2000s, however, market 
integration and political cooperation were clouded by an 
overarching concern with security. Under the pressure of 
the strongest partner, all North American countries rebuilt 
their domestic and foreign security apparatuses; adopting 
muscular anti-terrorism legislation for internal threats— 
often to the detriment of civil liberties—, and creating 
stronger military capabilities—spending impressively 
unprecedented amounts of public funds in the process. Yet, 
these measures seem unable to solve the drug war quagmire 
in Mexico, clearly a North American problem. 
 
Simultaneously, NAFTA’s trilateral spirit has been 
destroyed, mostly over measures to increase border security 
to even higher levels that are discussed and implemented on 
a bilateral basis. Overall, during this period of time, 
internal borders in North America became thicker, not 
lighter. This is especially true for most people traveling 
or moving from one North American country to another1. Yet, 
the flow of unauthorized migrants from Mexico to the United 
States keeps increasing, under the double pressure of 
demand for their labour in the north, and shrinking 
opportunities for economic improvement in the south. Canada 
followed suit, imposing visa requirements on Mexican 
travelers in 2009 and controlling the flows of temporary 
workers in an arbitrary manner. Xenophobic positions run 
amok throughout North America, even legitimized by 
mainstream politicians, justifying exclusionary views of 
                                                 
1 The exception to this general rule are business people and 
professionals benefiting from NAFTA’s chapter 16 or the programs made 
available for a fee to frequent travelers (Nexus). The extremely 
reduced number of people who benefit from eased travel requirements 
only underscores the exclusionary nature of the migratory regime in 
North America. See Abu-Laban, Yasmeen, “Migration in North America” in 
Abu-Laban, Y., ed., Politics in North America. Redefining Continental 
Relations, Peterborough: Broadview, 2008; pp. 339-352. 
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each other rather than mutual understanding among the 
peoples of the region. 
 
Smooth economic and political cooperation among the three 
countries in the region also remains an elusive goal twenty 
years after it was announced. North American governments 
did not react to the economic crisis unleashed in the fall 
2008 in a coordinated way, implementing instead piecemeal 
emergency measures with no regard for their consequences 
over the neighbours. The benefits of trade liberalization 
have not been evenly distributed, creating strong regional 
contrasts in terms of prosperity and worsening the 
concentration of household income measured in Gini 
coefficient terms. Nationalisms in the three countries 
remain strong and aggressive, especially in the United 
States, justifying exclusionary and unilateral actions 
against the supposed partners in North America. 
 
Common explanations of these developments, based on realist 
assumptions, have a hard time making sense of what 
happened. Their main problem, I would claim, is that these 
explanations use the state as their unit of analysis, thus 
neglecting domestic political actors and their political 
struggles that produced the observed outcomes. 
Additionally, realism tends to take government policy 
justifications at face value, without questioning the 
fundamental motivations and assumptions behind them. 
 
Giving back to ideologies their important place in domestic 
and continental politics, this paper proposes an 
alternative theoretical explanatory framework for the 
current state of the continent. I will argue that the ebbs, 
flows and paradoxes of North American integration are 
mostly due to the prevalence of right-wing conservative 
ideologies and their inherent contradictions. Indeed, these 
ideologies attempt to reconcile contradictory objectives, 
such as market goals with non-negotiable social concerns, 
tainted with hypernationalism and xenophobia; massive 
security spending with tax cuts; libertarian principles 
with social conservatism and intrusive and violent law 
enforcement, and so on. To the extent that conservatism has 
been a determinant factor in the construction of North 
America, these incompatible objectives eventually 
conflicted, thus creating the current uneven, chaotic North 
American architecture. 
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In order to make that case, this paper will first discuss 
the incongruous shape of the main right-wing actors in the 
three North American countries. Then it will illustrate how 
these contradictions have had negative impacts on public 
policy by focusing on three areas of particular importance 
for North America: migration, security and trade.  
 
The parties of the right: an uneasy alliance of business 
and moral imperatives. 
 
North American integration is a direct product of the end 
of the Cold War and the process of neoliberal globalization 
that followed. The collapse of the Soviet Union emboldened 
global capitalism into believing that there was no 
alternative left to unrestrained markets, so the only task 
that governments should reasonably accomplish within the 
realm of economic policy was to make those markets even 
freer. Neoliberalism and the policies that flowed from it 
became conventional wisdom, the hegemonic way of 
reorganizing economic relations among countries2. 
 
In North America, conservative actors thus acquired a 
hegemonic position. Conservative politicians, NGOs, 
economists, think tanks, media, parties, etc., ended up 
shaping the continent’s plans and priorities. Their agenda 
advanced by leaps and bounds whenever they directly ran the 
federal governments. This occurred especially during three 
years, from the beginning of 2006 to the end of 2008, when 
conservative parties were simultaneously at the helm of 
governments across North America. 
 
The mainstream parties that are the standard bearers of the 
right in Canada, Mexico and the United States are the 
Conservative Party of Canada, the National Action Party 
(PAN) and the Republican Party. They have some important 
features in common. For the purposes of this paper, the 
most important commonality is that all three parties 
resulted from the convergence of all kinds of pro-market, 
conservative, and religious political interests; that came 
together in an effort to maximize their electoral leverage. 
The second important commonality is that at different 
points in time they have directed the federal government of 
their respective country of origin, giving momentum to pro-
                                                 
2 Noël, Alain and Jean-Philippe Thérien, Left and Right in Global 
Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; pp. 137-165. 
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market policies such as trade liberalization, 
privatizations, deregulation and fiscal austerity. 
 
Canada’s present-day Conservative Party was born in 2003, 
from the merger of two pre-existing parties: the 
Progressive Conservative Party (PCP) and the Canadian 
Alliance (CA). The respective origins of these parties are 
very different, even contrasting. The PCP was the heir of 
traditional conservatism in Canada, strongly influenced by 
British conservative thought. This brand of conservatism, 
commonly known as Toryism, played a leadership role in the 
very creation of the Dominion of Canada in 1867. Later on, 
it developed a distinctive brand of conservatism known as 
“red Toryism”, which blended political conservatism with 
social responsibility of the state toward the masses3. The 
PCP was able to form several governments through the 20th 
century until it faced a crushing defeat in 1993, which 
reduced its presence in Parliament to only two seats. 
 
In contrast, the Canadian Alliance originated from the 
Reform Party, created in 1987 on the wave of Western 
Canadian discontent with the way Canada’s federation was 
run. From the start, the new party adopted a platform that 
blended populist appeals to reinventing government with 
market-based policy solutions to Canada’s challenges4. It 
also attracted large numbers of Christian evangelists, who 
found in the party a way to make their values heard in 
Ottawa. The new party was not conservative in the 
traditional Canadian sense, but rather right-wing, closely 
resembling the Republican Party in the United States (see 
below). Because at the time of the merger the Canadian 
Alliance was in a stronger parliamentary position than the 
PCP, its cadres and ideology became predominant and 
immediately displaced Toryism. 
 
The National Action Party was created in 1939, as a 
reaction to the radical reforms then operated by Mexico’s 
post-revolutionary regime. It resulted from the 
collaboration between Catholic militants and technocratic, 
business interests, both disgruntled with their marginal-
                                                 
3 Taylor, Charles, Red Tories. The Conservative Tradition in Canada, 
Toronto: Anansi, 1982. 
4 Laycock, David, “Populism and the New Right in English Canada” in 
Panizza, Francisco, ed., Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, London: 
Verso, 2005; pp. 172-201. 
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ization from meaningful political participation5. The 
coexistence between those two main groups was not always 
easy, and it reached a confrontational high point in the 
1970s, when the Catholic faction imposed a Christian 
humanist platform on the party. The business wing rebelled, 
and created a pragmatic current called “neopanismo” which 
was dead serious in competing and winning elections. It 
found the opportunity to prevail when it led the opposition 
to the nationalization of the banks decreed in 1982. After 
a series of regional victories, the PAN established itself 
as a serious party, able to capitalize on popular 
discontent against the post-revolutionary regime, and won 
the 2000 presidential elections. 
 
In the US, the Republican Party also amalgamated a 
disparate array of conservative and right-wing interests, 
building on the systemic incentives to bipartisan politics 
existing in that country. The party was able to accommodate 
under a single organization social conservatives and 
corporate interests. As explained by Jeff Faux: “The 
organizing genius of conservative Republicans was to 
compartmentalize the two opposing value systems so they 
reinforced each other against what was perceived as a 
common liberal enemy. The social conservatives would bring 
grassroots energy. The corporations would bring the money”6. 
In particular, Republicans benefited from  
 
a) The business backlash against the Welfare state 
launched since the early 1970s, symbolized by the 
Powell Memorandum7 
b) The religious right, mobilized with explicit 
electoral purposes first in 1980, with Jerry 
Falwell’s “Moral Majority”, then in 1988 with Pat 
Robertson’s “Christian Coalition”8 
                                                 
5 Loaeza, Soledad, “The National Action Party (PAN): From the Fringes of 
the Political System to the Heart of Change” in Mainwaring, Scott and 
Timothy R. Scully, eds., Christian Democracy in Latin America : 
Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003; pp. 196-246. 
6 Faux, Jeff, The Global Class War. How America’s Bipartisan Elite Lost 
Our Future and What It Will Take to Win It Back, Hoboken: John Wiley, 
2006; p. 82. 
7 Available at 
http://reclaimdemocracy.org/corporate_accountability/powell_memo_lewis.
html 
8 Martin, William, With God on Our Side. The Rise of the Religious Right 
in America, New York: Broadway Books, 1996. 
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c) The generous use of populism, aimed at convincing 
the masses of the superior democratic qualities of 
the market over party competition9. 
 
The Republican new-found strength was first decisively 
manifested in Ronald Reagan’s victories in the early 1980s, 
surfing on a tidal wave of popular support10.The Democratic 
administrations of Clinton (1992-200) and Obama (2008-
present) have been unable to reverse the right turn in US 
politics that started with Reagan11. 
 
In sum, in all three North American countries we witness a 
process of gradual, sometimes uneasy amalgamation of pro-
market, business right-wing and socially, religion-inspired 
conservative organizations. In principle, these factions 
have been able to coexist, to the extent that they share 
some core values, such as the rejection of state 
intervention in the private lives of people, seen both as 
economic and moral subjects. By the same token, they 
generally praise the primacy of the market over society. 
They are equally pessimistic about human nature, thus 
supporting a heavy-handed approach to the preservation of 
law and order as a condition for peaceful human 
coexistence. Finally, they pragmatically agree that they 
need each other to gain the necessary political momentum to 
win elections and thus implement public policy. 
 
However, quite often, when it comes to putting specific 
public policies into practice, the different conservative 
right factions aim at goals that are not only incompatible 
with one another but end up undermining the very efficacy 
of these policies. In order to illustrate this paradox—
political expediency destroying policy efficacy—I will 
briefly discuss three broad public policy areas: migration, 
security and trade.  
 
Migration Policy 
Mexican migrants into the United States have historically 
been an important economic factor. Since the building of 
                                                 
9 Frank, Thomas, One Market under God. Extreme Capitalism, Market Popul-
ism, and the End of Economic Democracy, New York: Anchor Books, 2000; 
pp. 23-50.  
10 Faux, The Global Class War…; pp. 76-89. 
11 George, Susan, Hijacking America. How the Religious and Secular Right 
Changed what Americans Think, Cambridge: Polity, 2008: pp. 1-12, 243-
254. 
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the railroads two centuries ago to intensive agriculture, 
retail, fast food, manufacturing and the hospitality 
industry today, countless business operations in the United 
States have relied on the supply of abundant and affordable 
labour flowing from the south12. This labour was important 
in the accumulation phase of these economic activities, 
providing a net subsidy that made these industries viable 
and competitive. Its importance has not waned, since 
“Northern capital today requires labor that is maximally 
cheap and exploitable—hirable at subminimum wage, without 
benefits or regard for regulations on overtime, health, 
environment or safety, and easily dispatched when not 
needed”13 
 
Yet, despite their crucial economic importance, migrants 
are socially and politically rejected as undesirables. 
Migrants from Mexico have commonly been constructed in the 
United States as the epitome of the Other, as invading 
hordes that not only violate regulations but also abuse 
public services and threaten to destroy the host society’s 
social fabric.  
 
Demonization of migrants is, paradoxically, very 
politically and economically convenient to some specific 
interests. Many a politician14 has built a successful career 
by portraying themselves as the defenders of the country’s 
integrity against the onslaught of illegal immigration. 
Anti-immigrant policies also justify the preservation and 
continuous growth of the surveillance complex, a multi-
million dollar industry paid with public monies that 
provides employment to thousands of officials and other 
employees. Both contractors and border enforcers have a 
vested interest in preserving and even enhancing this 
surveillance complex. 
 
Most people who hire migrants and/or portray them as 
undesirables, all the while reaping the political and 
economic benefits of their presence in the United States, 
are Republicans or at least identify themselves with that 
party. Economic interest leads them in one direction, 
social conservatism in the opposite sense. A telling 
                                                 
12 Mize, Ronald. L. and Alicia Swords, Consuming Mexican Labour. From 
the Bracero Program to NAFTA,  Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2011. 
13 Brown, Wendy, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, New York: Zone 
Books, 2010; p. 111. 
14 Including Tom Tancredo, Jesse Helms, John McCain, among many others. 
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example clearly illustrates this irony: Golden State Fence 
Company, a private subcontractor installing sections of the 
wall along the Mexico-US border mandated by the Secure 
Fence Act (2006), hired hundreds of undocumented workers to 
do the job15. 
 
Recently, international migration has become politicized in 
Canada too, as it has been reframed as a security issue16. 
Since 2006, successive Conservative governments have 
advanced an increasingly restrictive agenda that is 
changing the basic tenets of this country’s migration 
policy. In February 2012, the Harper government introduced 
an omnibus bill styled “Bill C-31, Protecting Canada’s 
Immigration Act” 17. The new bill consolidates and 
strengthens partial, negotiated reforms introduced in the 
recent past, allegedly aimed at controlling the flow and 
stay in Canada of refuge claimants and deterring human 
smuggling into this country. Bill C-31 is adding more 
restrictive features, such as: a) giving the minister the 
ability to unilaterally determine which countries are safe 
and democratic, thus automatically rejecting claimants 
coming from those countries18, b) speeding the refugee claim 
process, limiting the possibilities for investigation and 
appeal, c) refugee claimants who were somehow assisted to 
reach Canada are subject to a discriminatory treatment, 
accused of being complicit with human trafficking, and d) 
the government gives to itself the power to collect 
biometric information on anyone coming to Canada, either as 
visitor or worker, allegedly as a meausre intended at 
deterring future frivolous refugee claims. The 
parliamentary opposition sees the new bill as a betrayal of 
previously negotiated compromises for migration reform, 
aimed at ramming the government’s conservative agenda now 
that the PCP is leading a majority government. They also 
accuse the government of scapegoating immigrants, without 
really making Canada more secure for that action. 
 
                                                 
15 Brown, ibid. 
16 Crépeau, François and Delphine Nakache, “Controlling Irregular 
Migration in Canada. Reconciling Security Concerns with Human Rights 
Protection” in IRPP Choices, vol. 12, no.1, Febrary 2006. 
17 See Cohen, Tobi, “Tories Beef up Refugee Legislation” in Edmonton 
Journal, February 17, 2012; p. A16. 
18 Notably, refugee claimants coming from Mexico and Hungary, where real 
dangers exist for people threatened respectively by the drug cartels 
and extreme right anti-Roma militias, have been turned over and even 
deported back to their countries of origin. 
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Migrants leaving Mexico are also judged under a double 
discourse in their country of origin. On the one hand, 
especially since the PAN government led by Vicente Fox, 
they are praised and courted as a part of the Mexican 
nation that provides an important economic contribution to 
their country of origin through to the money they send to 
their relatives (the so-called remittances). On the other 
hand, however, migrants are also seen in Mexico as a handy 
solution to the pressures, both real and potential, derived 
from the increasing abandonment to unemployment of 
impoverished peasants , the urban poor and, more recently, 
the society at large. The notion of emigration to the 
United States as an “escape valve” was conveniently adopted 
by the Mexican government to avoid defending or actually 
protecting migrants, other than through rhetorical 
references19. 
 
Security Policy 
Although cooperation on security matters was not part of 
NAFTA’s original design, 9-11 put this policy area 
decidedly at the centre of the North American agenda. As a 
result, all three governments, to different extents, 
implemented anti-terrorism strategies, boosted their 
defence expenditures and engaged into muscular illegal drug 
enforcement. This extraordinary diversion of public 
attention, institutional effort and government monies built 
on fear of repeated terrorist attacks instilled in the 
population, conservative law and order priorities, social 
conservative concerns about the use of drugs and a general 
sense of insecurity felt by many. 
 
However, providing a sense that the government is doing 
something to increase people’s security and safety comes at 
a high cost. The consequences of the security apparatus 
buildup are vast and alarming20, even from a conservative 
point of view. There are at least three troubling 
developments associated with it:  
                                                 
19 Bustamante, Jorge A. “A Dialectical Understanding of The Vulnerabil-
ity of International Migrants” in Castro Rea, Julián, ed., Our North 
America: Social and Political Issues beyond NAFTA, Farnham: Ashgate, 
2012.  
20 A comprehensive discussion of those impacts is found in Castro-Rea, 
Julián, “Assessing North American Politics after September 11. Secur-
ity, Democracy, and Sovereignty” in Ayres, Jeffrey and Macdonald, 
Laura, eds., Contentious Politics in North America: National Protest 
and Transnational Collaboration under Continental Integration, London: 
Palgrave, 2009. 
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1. Exponential increase of government expenditure, which 
directly violates the priority of fiscal conservatives 
of keeping expenses and state economic intervention to 
a minimum. Security expenditure has reached such 
levels that it might soon become unsustainable, 
especially during this era of economic crisis21, 
 
2. Anti-terrorism measures resulted in important 
restrictions to civil rights and freedoms, promptly 
justified by their proponents as necessary given the 
emergency situation22. Suspension of individual freedom 
and the rule of law, however, should be a major 
concern for right-wing libertarians. 
  
3. The death toll provoked by the drug war in Mexico has 
reached horrific levels. Since December 2006, it has 
claimed the lives of at least 47,000 people in only 
five years23. Despite the escalating militarization and 
violence that it creates, the drug war has had limited 
effects in curbing the cartels’ power or actually 
reducing the production and distribution of illegal 
substances. Requests made by the Mexican government to 
Washington to do something to stop the traffic of guns 
that end in the hands of drug dealers are rebuffed 
with the argument that unlimited gun possession and 
sale is a constitutional right in the United States. 
 
Trade Policy 
Trade liberalization was at the centre of the launch of 
trilateral cooperation in North America. It was sold as a 
sure path to prosperity for all countries involved. The 
increased wealth it was supposed to produce would improve 
everyone’s standards of living, from business people to 
workers. In order for that to occur, a regime of full 
national treatment for trade and investment was proposed, 
and NAFTA was a decisive step in that direction. 
Deregulation and tax cuts were supposed to entice 
                                                 
21 Johnson, Chalmers, Dismantling the Empire: America's Last Best Hope, 
New York: Henry Holt, 2011. 
22 Castro-Rea, ibid. 
23 The government estimate of victims is 47,500 (from Dec. 2006 to Dec. 
2011). Independent estimates, based on reports by federal, state and 
local law enforcement agencies, claim a much larger total of 60,420 for 
the same period; that is, an average of 12,000 deaths per year. See 
Mendoza Hernández, Enrique, “Cinco años de guerra, 60 mil muertos” in 
Proceso, no. 1832, Dec. 11, 2011; pp. 16-21. 
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corporations to invest more, to the extent that less 
governmental intervention was supposed to help them become 
more competitive and productive. 
 
However, although these conservative dogmas were very 
useful excuses for the governments to shy away from 
implementing positive remedies to alleviate the impacts of 
trade liberalization, they did not live up to reality. 
Assumptions of automatic growth once the market was fully 
liberalized acted as a deterrent for government action 
aimed at improving distribution measures (better minimum 
wages, progressive fiscal regimes, and the like)24. 
Additionally, nationalism crept in, creating important 
exceptions to the regime of national treatment; the most 
blatant of which are the “Buy American” policies put in 
place since 2009 to stimulate economic recovery in the US. 
 
The response that the three governments offered to the 
economic crisis manifested since the fall 2008 has been 
tepid, piecemeal, and over all ineffective. Harper’s 
“Canada Action Plan” was discontinued after three years, 
leaving infrastructure works half way through at a time 
when the economy is not still sitting on firm grounds. Cuts 
to government spending, particularly in social programs, 
are already being made, putting the fragile economic 
recovery in jeopardy. 
 
Right-wing ideologies are an obstacle to the sustained 
adoption of alternative approaches to economic policy 
making. The market is supposed to create in due time what 
the governments refuse to do to reboot the North American 
economy toward a more sustained growth, and to alleviate 
the urgent needs of marginalized populations across North 
America. 
 
Conclusions 
The casual observer is tempted to interpret the constant 
policy contradictions found among right-wing, conservative 
political actors in North America as a clever conspiracy to 
achieve their goals while deceiving the public into 
believing they are doing something else. For example, the 
combination of tax cuts to corporations and wealthy 
individuals with out of bounds expenditure on security is 
so blatantly absurd that it seems guided by a hidden, 
unacknowledged objective. Is this apparent incoherence a 
                                                 
24 Faux, The Global Class War…; pp. 35-37, 126-154. 
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cunning strategy to “starve the beast” of big government, 
making deep cuts inevitable once public finances are in 
crisis?25 
 
My discussion above suggests a different, more mundane 
explanation: conservative actors seem to be victims of 
their own success in creating effective political machines, 
amalgamating very disparate factions under a single 
umbrella. These coalitions work well during election times, 
animated by the common goal of reaching power. Once in 
power, these actors feel compelled to please their 
different constituencies simultaneously. Yet, different 
conservative supporters have contrasting priorities, which 
sooner or later clash when the time comes to put them into 
concrete action, producing incoherent and ultimately 
ineffective policies.  
 
Are these conservative political actors bothered by their 
dismal policy performance? It is highly unlikely. Looking 
at the sorry state of the three policy areas discussed 
above, and the way they fulfill political goals, we must 
come to the alarming conclusion that conservative actors do 
not seem to care about the internal coherence or the 
effectiveness of the policies they implement. In their 
view, what really matters is the political success they 
get, keeping their supporters content. 
 
We witness then a clear case of what Peter Andreas once 
called “policy failure, political success”26; which has 
become the hallmark of conservative governance throughout 
North America. In the process, conservatism is wrecking 
North America. 
                                                 
25 Maher, Stephen, “Harper Channelling Reagan with ‘Starve the Beast’ 
Strategy” in Edmonton Journal February 2, 2012; p. A21. 
26 Andreas, Peter, "US-Mexico: Open Market, Closed Borders" in Foreign 
Policy, no. 106, 1996; pp. 51-70.  
